

Sense, Reference, and Philosophy, by Jerrold J. Katz. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004, xvi + 224 pp., £30.00.

In this book — published after his death in 2002 — Katz proposes a non-Fregean notion of intensionalism which aims to survive the criticism that Frege's intensionalism faced (e.g., the Kripke-inspired direct reference criticism).

In the first two chapters ('Sense' and 'Reference,' pp. 12–69) Katz presents his positive account while in the last chapter (Chapter 3, 'Philosophy,' pp. 70–203) he attempts to show how his theory handles various philosophical problems. This second part is without doubt ambitious and one cannot do justice to all the philosophical problems Katz attempts to solve in the space of a review. Sometimes the discussion is a bit sketchy, yet always illuminating and clearly the product of a master philosopher.

As for Katz's own theory, he accepts the Fregean view that linguistic expressions have sense above reference but rejects the view that Fregean senses are reference-determiners. Thus a NP's sense is not what determines the NP's value; instead, sense should be explained — *pace* neo-Fregeans such as Evans and McDowell — without mention of reference. Senses are not *de re*. The notion of sense which emerges is a non-reductive one:

- (D) Sense is that aspect of the grammatical structure of sentences that is responsible for their sense properties and relations (e.g., meaningfulness, ambiguity, synonymy, redundancy, and antonymy) (p. 17).

This account differs from the Fregean one in that sense determines sense properties and relations but does not determine referential properties and relations. The theory of sense is thus independent and autonomous and consequentially notions such as 'meaningfulness,' 'ambiguity' etc., should be explained merely in terms of sense. Furthermore, the account of an expression having or missing a sense, or of an expression having the same sense as another expression, must be given purely in terms of senses and their mereological structure. A theory of sense concerns only the intra-linguistic properties and relations of sentences; this theory is silent about the more philosophically discussed world-language relationship. In this respect, Katz's theory is reminiscent of Chomsky's internalist approach. Katz's senses are similar to Chomsky's *internal meanings*, which contrast with

external meanings. Katz, along with Chomsky, rejects the philosophical tradition (inaugurated by Frege and Carnap and popularized by Dummett) which states that in understanding a word, (i) one associates a sense or concept which (ii) determines its reference. On the contrary, understanding a word involves making use of its internal properties. Such properties may play a role in determining the word's reference but any such referential relation must be understood as a property of use. In this respect, Katz's view echoes the famous Wittgensteinian dictum that meaning is use. Senses do not determine the value of either expression types or expression tokens. Non-literal uses of language suffice to undermine the view that the sense of an expression type determines its reference, whilst the success of reference using inaccurate descriptions (e.g. Donnellan's use of the description 'the man with the martini' to refer to a man drinking plain water) undermines the view that the sense of an expression token determines its reference. Instead, the reference of a token expression is determined both by the sense of the type and the sense of the token, preventing one from using language as Humpty Dumpty does, associating any expression with the meaning he wishes it to have.

The fact that 'house' is a distinct concept from 'home' is a property of their respective senses (or I-meanings). It is in virtue of these properties that 'I returned home late last night' makes sense, whereas 'I returned house last night' does not (cf. Chomsky, *New Horizons in the Study of Language and Mind*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 35). Similarly, Katz claims (p. 34–5) that since 'the knife is sharp' analytically entails 'the blade of the knife is sharp' but not 'the handle of the knife is sharp,' the component parts of the sense of 'knife' (*physical object, handle, blade, instrument for cutting*) must be both compositional and represented as independent components.

The question that springs to mind is how Katz's picture differs from that of inferential role and conceptual role semantics. Such conceptions, Katz claims, are guilty of assuming the Fregean principle that sense determines reference. As such, inferential and conceptual role semantics and Katz's autonomous theory of sense take diametric views on the basis of semantic theory. The former hold that sentences have meaning in virtue of their inference relations, while on Katz's view sentences satisfy inference relations in virtue of their meaning. According to Katz, sense is a primitive notion upon which entailment relations are based.

Katz's book is a welcome addition to the literature, the product of a masterful philosopher of language and linguistics which lives up to expectations. It will be especially welcomed by philosophers interested in how the notion of sense can be interpreted without the unwelcome consequences of Frege's account.

Eros Corazza
eros.corazza@nottingham.ac.uk
Dept. of Philosophy, University of Nottingham
University Park, Nottingham, NG7 2RD, UK

***Knowledge and Lotteries*, by John Hawthorne.** Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004, 205 pp., £25.00.

Often in philosophy our investigations are driven by puzzles. If in epistemology Chisholm's problem of the criterion strikes one as the epistemic must-solve puzzle in regard to knowledge, then one might be drawn to externalist theories like reliabilism — a theory much in favour among epistemologists the last decades. If however like John Hawthorne in this monograph, the lottery paradox is what makes your epistemology clock tick, then reliabilism is hardly a theory worth exploring.

The puzzle presented by the lottery paradox is well known. Even though I have good reasons to believe that a lottery ticket of mine will lose, it being very improbable that I have a winning ticket, I do not know it. On the other hand many mundane things we take ourselves to know entail such lottery propositions. I, for example, know where my suitcase is right now; it is upstairs in my hotel room. That, however, entails that I have not won the local Mexico City get-your-suitcase-stolen lottery (see p. 2 and 5 on how ordinary propositions entail lottery propositions and how to make the entailments strict). I do not know that. I know where I will be tomorrow; I will be in Guanajuato teaching. But then I know that I will not win the get-mugged-in-your-taxi lottery on the way out to the bus station. I do not know that. The conclusions forced on me are that I do not know where my suitcase is, I do not know where I will be tomorrow and so on for all non-observational beliefs. But that is not all. The problem generalizes further. By appealing to quantum mechanics Hawthorne argues that not even perceptual beliefs are free of lottery worries.