embrace an established pattern of changes as well as changelessness). It follows that the (mere) existence of the physical realm needs no explanation; the need for and possibility of explanation arises only for things in the universe, and then only when they cease to be ‘lazy’ — when they depart from the status quo (p. 190).

Steven Luper
Philosophy Department, Trinity University
1 Trinity Place, San Antonio, TX 78212, USA
sluper@trinity.edu


Saul Kripke is one of the most important philosophers of the 20th century: he made the range of issues that characterize the last 50 years of analytic philosophy what they are. No discussion these days on the semantics of proper names and of natural kind terms, semantic paradoxes, belief ascription, the mind-body problem, the distinction between the a priori and the necessary, among a host of others, can fail to refer to Kripke’s work. Christopher Hughes’ recent discussion of important themes from Kripke’s metaphysics and philosophy of language is one of a number of critical analyses that have finally begun to emerge on Kripke and the significance of his contributions to philosophy.

Although Kripke was not yet twenty when he made his first contribution to philosophy, the series of three lectures he gave at Princeton University in 1970, titled Naming and Necessity, is perhaps his best-known work. A prospective philosopher taking up Naming and Necessity would be assured of being introduced to a spectacularly comprehensive set of issues in philosophy of language, mind, metaphysics, and epistemology, along with a number of significant criticisms of the canonical positions, and some genuinely original contributions, in fewer than 200 pages. Naming and Necessity is required reading, and, indeed, for those philosophers who came into the field after 1970, it is difficult to imagine the state of play before Kripke. They really thought names were disguised descriptions? That necessary truths can only be known a priori? That mind-body identity is contingent? That this lectern could have been made of ice? Kripke changed the philoso-
Hughes describes his book as centering on a number of Kripke’s views in metaphysics and philosophy of language. Many of these are to be found in *Naming and Necessity*, and the related material in ‘Identity and Necessity,’ but Hughes also considers Kripke’s work on belief ascription and reference, and adds a discussion of aspects of Kripke’s unpublished 1978 lectures at Cornell on identity and time. The book reads as partly expository, and partly polemical. Hughes’ first two chapters (‘Names’ and ‘Necessity’), contain mostly expository sections, but, especially in the last two chapters (‘Identity, Worlds, and Times’ and ‘The Mental and the Physical’), Hughes develops critical views of his own. Kripke’s published work is sometimes a transcription of lectures delivered without text or notes; *Naming and Necessity* is the standout example. Consequently, some of Kripke’s theses are less developed than others, and Hughes takes it as an obligation to fill in the blanks, and this is helpful in a secondary source. Hughes describes and explains the themes he discusses in extensive detail, minutely considering contenders for counter-argument, and carefully assessing their success or failure, even where he does not think there is any serious controversy.

A solid and scholarly overview of Kripke’s work and its influence is nothing but welcome. But Hughes book is less than successful, on balance, in providing it. There are some mysterious aspects to the book with respect to Kripke scholarship. Hughes does explicitly state in his introduction that he has chosen to single out some of Kripke’s theses in metaphysics and philosophy of language to home in on; indeed, the subtitle of the book is ‘Names, Necessity, and Identity.’ Fair enough: but an argument could be made that these are themes that feature in other work of Kripke’s, work that is not referred to or cited. Someone who did not know that Kripke had written a book about Wittgenstein, for instance, would not learn this from Hughes. Another omission is Kripke’s 1975 article ‘Outline of Theory of Truth.’ These omissions struck me as peculiar; the more so in contrast to the detailed discussion of Kripke’s unpublished Cornell lectures that comes at the end of chapter three. It is debatable that the content of these lectures are well enough known to have entered into the public domain, as Hughes asserts; and the emphasis on unpublished work at the cost of the better-known and published material seems questionable in a book that at the same time purports to be an over-
view of Kripke’s important contributions to philosophy of language and metaphysics. One oddity I should mention also is that Hughes’ references to Naming and Necessity are mainly indexed to the 1972 material in the Davidson and Harman collection, not to the 1980 monograph, which has footnotes and a helpful preface added by Kripke, and which is in general considered the text of record.

In the preface, Hughes recounts the thought-processes that governed his choice of emphasis; I found the result uneven. My suspicion is that Hughes has written a book that expands on the Kripke-inspired issues (hence the subtitle) that he himself has found interesting enough to work on, neglecting central but relevant themes that fail to interest him. So taking it that this is a book that might better have been titled ‘Themes from Kripke,’ what does Hughes discuss and how well does he discuss it? There are four chapters, ‘Names,’ ‘Necessity,’ ‘Identity, Worlds, and Time,’ and ‘The Mental and the Physical.’ My discussion has space limitations so I will focus on a few things from the first two chapters, giving, I fear, shorter shrift to his detailed and intricate remarks on identity, worlds, and times, and the mental and the physical.

Hughes’ discussion of his chosen themes is close and detailed throughout, and if he seems sometimes to spend far too much time formulating versions of topics or issues that do not seem to need it, this might be simply a matter of taste. In Hughes’ first chapter, ‘Names,’ we find formulations of the descriptivist theory under attack by Kripke in Naming and Necessity (as well as formulations of rigidity, the causal theory of reference, and the like) that improve on Kripke’s own, if only from the point of view of thoroughness. But I confess to getting impatient working my way through the chapter, which is not to scorn Hughes’ meticulous delineation of the issues. What I found myself thinking about, however, and wanting more of, was the more general significance of Kripke’s theses about reference, descriptions, and meaning (in this chapter), and I did find myself wishing for more forest, and fewer trees, as Hughes indeed explicitly indicates, in the preface, that a reader might.

For instance, the significance of Kripke’s views on the semantics of natural kind terms has had a great impact on theories of meaning since the 1970s, with concomitant consequences for theories of mind — somewhat paradoxically, it may be said, since the causal thesis fails to apply to most kinds of content. Hughes does indeed seem to miss out the larger context into which it fits, not directly
discussing or linking Putnam’s or Burge’s contributions. Hughes does not discuss the failure of the causal thesis to apply more widely, nor its contemporary impact in spite of this, and gives instead a number of pedantic formulations and re-formulations of concepts like rigidity and descriptivism, for instance, which seem ultimately to go nowhere in terms of an explanation of Kripke’s influence on issues that arise between naming and necessity — which, on the face of it, are not particularly obvious, and could use some detailed context.

One slightly off-putting aspect of Hughes’ style is consistent with the tendency in some quarters of the philosophy of language to emphasize formalization (even when it is spurious) — an ironic contrast to Kripke’s own style, which is a model of unfussy clarity. The tendency toward formalization here sacrifices much of wider philosophical significance, leaving the reader, at best, to have to piece it together for herself. Where formalization does come in handy, however, is with respect to the subject of modality, and in chapter two Hughes begins by giving a nicely appropriate formal précis of modal logic, summarizing the various axiomatizations that made their appearance from Lewis’ early 1912 work to Marcus’ axioms for quantified modal logic in the 1940s. His segue to Kripke’s semantics for modal logic is elegant, and his discussion is crystal clear, making a complex topic look easy, or, at least, easier to understand.

Hughes’ discussion of Quine’s objections to modal logic, and the connection he makes between Quine’s objections to it and Kripke’s discussion of the distinction between the necessary and the a priori, however, is less satisfactory. I agree with Hughes that Kripke’s ‘remodalization’ of the philosophical landscape was unique and far-reaching. Others were (for instance) holding the line against Quine, and with great force, but Kripke’s ‘Naming and Necessity’ lectures, for example, really were decisive, because they went so much further. What I was again disappointed not to find in this chapter was a clear linking of the issues in question, and, perhaps more disturbing, a significant absence of reference to much of what has become the canonical literature on this in the past 30 years (classics by Soames, for instance, go unmentioned).

Hughes shares the intuition of many that one of the most ground-breaking of Kripke’s theses in *Naming and Necessity* was his prying apart of the historical grouping of the analytic, the a priori, and the necessary, as against the synthetic, the a posteriori, and the contingent. Briefly, Kripke argues that *necessary* and *contingent* are metaphysi-
cal concepts, and that *a priori* and *a posteriori* are epistemological concepts, and that, in effect, historical tradition conflates two entirely different notions. Hughes’ discussion focuses at some length on attempts to blunt the force of Kripke’s examples of the necessary a posteriori. I had two misgivings about his treatment.

The first is about the view Hughes discusses as a possible spoiler. Hughes writes that his purpose is to discourage complacency about a line of reasoning that begins with the rigidity of proper names, and that goes on to result in the view that ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ is necessary (or not) but not determinable *a priori*, with the help of Stalnaker’s view that analyses belief states as sets of possible worlds. What is peculiar is Hughes’ claim (p. 90) that ‘Kripke does not show sympathy for, or even discuss, Stalnaker’s view.’ The earliest full-fledged version of Stalnaker’s view comes some years after *Naming and Necessity*; so there must be some reason to think that Kripke was familiar with it before that. And indeed, Hughes tells us (note 130, p. 90), that, according to Stalnaker, the view *was suggested by Kripke* — but we are told nothing more. It is unclear to me what point Hughes is trying to make here, and I found the sequence perplexing.

My other (more serious) misgiving about this issue is that Hughes does not address the crucial question as to *why* this is significant. Hughes ends up claiming (at some length) what I think no one has ever seriously doubted: namely, that Kripke is no partisan of either the necessary a posteriori nor the contingent a priori, but, instead, is a strong challenger to the entrenched view that all and only necessary truths are knowable a priori. And the significance of *that*, in my view, needed more discussion. The opportunity was available: Hughes does include, in his discussion of Quine’s objections to quantified modal logic, the familiar Quinean assertion that the notion of analyticity is incoherent, and infects any understanding of a notion of necessity in terms of it. But Kripke’s and Putnam’s discussion of the semantics of terms like ‘water’ have had far-reaching consequences on the understanding of the nature of analyticity, the a priori, and the necessary, and some discussion of this would have been appropriate.

What the so-called causal theory of reference can show us is that Quine was implicitly influenced by a pervasive characterization of meaning as a state of mind. Conflating the act of thought with the object of thought (one way of putting the problem), for instance, makes it easy to claim that a necessary proposition is knowable a priori (and a proposition known a priori is necessary). A proposition
whose constituents are not mind-independent objects or their properties will be composed of entities whose nature is not that of the empirical world, not subject to alteration, and to which we have incorrigible introspective access. That conflation — which amounts to a confusion of the metaphysical with the epistemological — lies behind the historical distinction between the analytic and the synthetic, and Quine was among the first contemporary philosophers to attempt to resist it. Ultimately, however, it was Kripke, Putnam, Burge, and others, who developed a novel semantic analysis of (some) expressions, and delivered the conclusion that the determination-conditions of content necessarily involve non-mentalist characterized entities. One interesting and important result of this was to make clear that some propositions could be necessarily true (in virtue of the necessary relations between their constituents, or the references of their constituents), but could only be so discovered a posteriori (because meaning does not always determine reference). This position has begun to loosen the choke hold of so-called internalist theories about content, and paved the way for a reformulation of some of the most entrenched issues at the heart of contemporary metaphysics and philosophy of language. The significance of Kripke’s position on the distinction between the a priori and the necessary, therefore, is powerful, and, I would argue, still underappreciated in some ways, 30 years later, and I believe Hughes is missing part of the big picture here.

I think this was also noticeable in Hughes’ discussion of counterpart theory and possible worlds in chapter three and of the mind-body identity thesis in chapter four. I found Hughes’ emphasis in chapter three to be focused on what might be considered a very narrowly specialized part of the literature on this issue, one that takes Kripke’s work as a springboard, but that rapidly leaves anything to do with Kripke’s own views off to one side. I did however find Hughes’ treatment of Kripke’s discussion of the mind-body identity thesis very thoroughly detailed, although he seems once more to sacrifice a critical analysis of Kripke’s approach to the necessity of true identity statements in favor of a series of discussions that focus on minutiae that fail to link to a bigger picture. One widely discussed aspect of Kripke’s position, for instance, is the connection between Kripke’s claims about conceivable and the role of the distinction Kripke carves between the epistemological (conceivability) and the metaphysical (possibility). Hughes also does not incorporate some of the
important literature on this, and I thought it undermined his otherwise interesting discussion.

I think it is possible to make a strong case for the view that what Kripke has done, throughout his work, is cast a line through some of the most entrenched issues in philosophy of language, mind, metaphysics and epistemology, linking them with great originality along an axis that turns mainly on his intuitions concerning necessity. The fertility of this approach has been extraordinary. It is quite likely that some of Kripke’s positions do not stand the test of time, but I am not convinced that Hughes has taken the most efficient path to demonstrating it: he has gone vertical, as it were, instead of horizontal. If you have never read Kripke and you want an introduction, this book will teach you a lot about some very specific issues. If you are well up on Kripke’s views and some of the literature that has clustered around the topics of names, necessity, and identity, this book will satisfy your desire to dig down, if not wide.

Consuelo Preti
The College of New Jersey
Dept. of Philosophy, P.O. Box 7718
Ewing, New Jersey 08628–0718, USA
preti@tcnj.edu


In his new book, Graham Priest, well known for his vigorous defense of dialetheism (the view that there are true contradictions), espouses the no less philosophically unpopular view that there are many objects that do not exist in any sense whatsoever, such as fictional and mythical objects, merely possible (and impossible!) objects and worlds, and abstract objects such as numbers and propositions. The book is dedicated to the memory of Richard Routley/Sylvan, the New Zealand philosopher who had earlier championed a view of this kind in his Exploring Meinong’s Jungle and Beyond. Routley called this radical neo-Meinongian view ‘noneism’ — Meinong himself had thought that some non-concrete objects like numbers do have a form of existence, while Routley thought that none of them did. Priest follows this